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Introduction: Tete as El Dorado
"A desperate search for bonds that pay a decent rate of interest and a keen desire for exposure to economies that are still growing quickly have taken rich-world investors to some exotic places. The raciest bets are made in so-called frontier markets, poorer places with even less mature financial sectors than emerging markets. Africa is full of them…The farthest edge of the investing frontier has now reached Mozambique" (The Economist, 2013: 1) .
Widely viewed as something of a donor darling and often scripted as a post-conflict success story, Mozambique has in recent years emerged as one of the brightest stars in the Africa rising narrative. In her keynote address to the 'Africa Rising' conference, jointly held by the IMF and the Mozambican state in May 2014, IMF Managing Director Christine Lagarde lavished praise on the country for its "remarkable" growth and claimed that it "epitomised" the current positive economic optimism and outlook for the continent (Lagarde, 2014) . Mozambique's GDP registered annual growth rates between 6. 3% and 8.7% from 2003 (African Economic Outlook, 2014 and it is projected to stay above 8% in the next several years. In 2002 FDI inflows stood at US$347.58m, but by 2013 they had reached US$5.9 billion (World Bank, 2014a), placing Mozambique above Nigeria as the largest recipient of FDI inflows in Africa (Business Day, 2014) .
The discovery of enormous reserves of coal and gas and the explosive boom in the country's extractives sector has led to a new wave of unbridled optimism about the future prospects for national growth and development. In 2008 visiting geologists in the central province of Tete discovered that the coal seam beneath Moatize basin is part of the largest undeveloped coal basin on the planet, believed to hold over 23 billion metric tonnes of coal -enough to fire all the coal plants in the United States for 25 years (Gerety, 2013) . Coal exports could reach 100 million tonnes annually at peak, making Mozambique one of the world's top ten coal exporters (World Bank, 2014b) . Further, in 2011, Italian and US energy companies ENI and Anadarko made vast offshore gas finds in the Rovuma Basin, on the northern border with Tanzania.
Analysts expect that Mozambique will receive US$115 billion in revenue from liquefied natural gas (LNG) exports between 2020 and 2040, but this will require developing two greenfield LNG facilities in Cabo Delgado, led by ENI and Anadarko (IEA, 2014) . 4 Tete is not a historically important minerals producer and was largely unknown to global mining companies until the past decade (Bryceson and MacKinnon, 2012) .
Mining giants Vale and Rio Tinto have invested nearly US$12 billion in mines in
Tete since 2008, directly employing some 7,500 workers and sparking a sudden transformation of the region into Mozambique's El Dorado (Mosca and Selemane, 2011) . Invoking the language of modernization, the World Bank (2010: 46) observed "increasing expectations that the province's significant mining potential is finally set to take off" with potential to create a "growth pole" in the region. Despite recent drops in coal prices and ongoing problems with logistics and infrastructure, Moatize basin is now the focus of a series of energy-related mega-projects that the ruling party Frelimo (Frente de Libertação de Moçambique) hopes will facilitate the rapid modernization of the country.
[ Figure 1 about here]
In this paper, our analytical focus centres on a number of distinct yet converging spatial configurations that are emerging in Tete province (see Figure 1 ), which has been at the centre of the extractives boom. First, in response to the serious logistical problems that Mozambique has experienced with transporting coal for export, there are the transport corridors and infrastructure networks being constructed around the extractive industries, including the Nacala Logistics Corridor project. Such have been the unforeseen challenges of extractive growth in Tete that Rio Tinto, a major investor, 'wrote down' its assets in Mozambique by billions of dollars in 2013. In July 2014, Rio Tinto sold its coal assets in Mozambique to the Indian state-run International Coal Ventures (ICVL) for US$50 million, three years after paying US$3.7 billion for the mines (Hoyle, 2014) . Paralleling these developments are largescale land acquisition schemes that aim to open up Mozambique's once-remote northern savannahs, such as the ProSavana project, jointly funded by the governments of Japan and Mozambique, with technical cooperation from Brazil. These investments seek to restructure the region by fostering the privatization and enclosure of land while installing export-oriented agriculture to accompany resource extraction and emergent regional transport infrastructure networks. 5 Second, there are the enclavic economic spaces arising from the coal boom and the new labour relations that characterise them. There are growing concerns regarding these spaces of enclosure, the limited local participation in the coal value chain and the disembedded and detached nature of this development. Despite the claims about "remarkable" and "miraculous" economic transformation, recent economic growth relies heavily on mega-projects in the aluminium, extractives and energy sectors (AfDB, 2014) with little evidence of a wider structural transformation. Further, there is a large poor urban and rural population that remain deeply disconnected from these trends (Mosca and Selemane, 2011; Saul, 2011) . Even the World Bank (2014b: 39) has tempered its earlier optimism about the resource boom by noting that Mozambique does not appear to be following the "normal" trajectory for development, as other types of capital are not growing, cautioning that "unrealistic expectations about Mozambique's resource wealth and prospective revenues from the extractive-industries sector may already be developing", with increased potential for social conflict.
Moreover, there has been renewed armed conflict between ruling Frelimo and former rebel movement and opposition party Renamo (Resistência Nacional Moçambicana) that can, in part, be linked to contestation over the extractives boom. In July 2013, Renamo threatened to sabotage the rail and road infrastructures surrounding mining operations, while frequent attacks on government defence forces near the Sena railway prompted Rio Tinto to suspend exports sent by rail for a week (Mining Weekly, 2013) . In April 2014, Vale briefly halted the transport of coal from Moatize after gunmen shot at one of its trains, injuring a conductor (AllAfrica, 2014a ).
Renamo's leader Afonso Dhlakama also moved the party's HQ to the northern city of Nampula, close to the two major provinces at the heart of the extractives boom, in contrast to what he constructs as "Maputo-centric" Frelimo, and has spoken of "dividing the country in two" along a North-South axis (Vines, 2013; AllAfrica, 2014b) .
Third, there are the new urban geographies emerging in Tete. In the days of the Portuguese empire, Tete was viewed as a colonial "backwater" (Isaacman and Isaacman, 2013) with practically no roads and the vast majority of its male population migrating to find mining and farm jobs in South Africa, Rhodesia and Katanga 6 province in the DRC. Although the onset of anti-colonial war in the 1960s brought significant investment, especially following the construction of a huge hydroelectric scheme at Cahora Bassa, Tete remained something of a forgotten province isolated from the centres of political and economic power, a kind of periphery within the periphery. After independence in 1975, and given its isolation and remoteness from the capital city, the province continued to reside on the edges of post-colonial modernity. The extractives boom and accompanying rapid urbanisation have, however, drastically changed the face of Tete's urban geographies with dramatic land use and demographic changes in the city centre and its outskirts and considerable displacement and resettlement of local communities due to coal operations. Added to the controversy over population displacement are wider concerns about the limited fiscal regime for the state's management of natural resources and the state's failure to locally redistribute the wealth generated by hydrocarbon revenues. Standards were initially set low to avoid putting off investors, but the state introduced a new Mining Tax Law in September 2014, which established that that all capital gains, arising from the direct or indirect transfer of mining rights by nonresident entities with or without permanent establishment in Mozambique, will be taxable at a fixed rate of 32%.
Additionally, the Mozambican state has lacked sufficient knowledge about its own natural resources and often the only source of information about the quality of the minerals, their market prices, reserves and operational costs are the companies themselves.
The scripting of post-socialist Mozambique as a wild frontier for various forms of investment is by no means new (Power and Sidaway, 1998) but the country has increasingly come to feature prominently in forecasts produced by investment banks, corporate analysts and asset management firms about the world's fastest growing frontier markets. As an exotic location then on the farthest edges of a shifting global investment frontier, and as a focal point for what The Economist (2013) calls some of the "raciest bets" being made in the "desperate" search for accumulation, Mozambique has been "transformed from a basket case to one of the world's most rapidly expanding economies" (Maritz, 2012) .
We argue here that the coal bonanza is creating particular landscapes, spaces and sites of development in Tete as some groups benefit from and are integrated into global 7 circuits of production while others suffer displacement and dispossession. We seek to examine what the 'extractivist turn' in Mozambique means for the way its 'development' is being imagined and how the 'extractivist mindset' (Klein, 2014) being embraced by the Mozambican state, of treating land and people as resources to deplete and exploit, is shaping some of the affected regions, places and communities.
In Tete, we argue, there is evidence of emergent 'spaces of postdevelopment' (Sidaway, 2007) _resulting from macroshifts in the geography of accumulation, the increasing fragmentation of national territory and the disintegration of Frelimo's postcolonial nationalist and socialist development project. The paper situates the emergence of Tete's resource economy within international debates around the nexus of geography, the economy, resources and development (Hayter et al., 2003; Bridge, 2010; Sheppard, 2013) . It seeks to assess the impacts, stakes and challenges linked to investments in extractive activities and looks at how the costs and risks are being differentially distributed within and between communities. The first section of the paper engages with recent work on resource peripheries, extractive enclaves and spaces of post-development before introducing the historical context of Tete. The paper then provides an analysis of the coal mega-projects emerging in Tete and their connections to wider national strategies of economic development. Such projects, we argue, are richly illustrative of the Mozambican state's contemporary vision of economic growth and the challenge of ensuring that extractive industries are locally connected and embedded beyond the enclavic spaces and 'thin' socialities they occupy and inhabit or that they spark wider socio-economic transformations. The final section then explores in more depth the three particular spatialities that we contend are the result of this emerging resource economy: (1) the infrastructure networks being constructed around the extractive industries; (2) the enclave spaces arising from the coal boom and the particular labour geographies that shape them and (3) the new urban geographies unfolding in Tete and the processes of displacement and dispossession that characterise its rapid urbanisation. In each case there are significant intersections of enclosure and enclavisation underway that are the consequence of intensified processes and patterns of uneven development, and which provide a valuable insight into the 'winners' and 'losers' of Mozambique's supposedly 'miraculous' economic transformation in recent years.
Resource peripheries, enclosure and post-development 8 Since the late 1990s, global economic growth, driven mostly by the major emerging economies, has supported a commodity resources boom. Although there is evidence that the demand for some resources (e.g. oil) within emerging economies is now beginning to cool, it is clear that the decline of the long post-war boom in the industrialized core since the 1970s, and the end of the "age of plenty" or of cheap and readily-accessible fossil fuels, has been marked by changing geographies of resource extraction and capital accumulation. Extractive industry is expanding into new resource peripheries, including "ungoverned" or marginalized spaces and conflict zones (Magrin and Perrier-Bruslé, 2011) . These unconventional locations are increasingly a feature of the 21 st century's international political economy of fossil fuels, including oil, gas and coal (Bridge and Le Billon, 2013 (Magrin and Perrier-Bruslé, 2011; Bridge and Le Billon, 2013) .
Multinational corporations are increasingly engaging in techniques for managing risk and protecting their operations, such as employing private security companies and mercenaries to ensure that costly investments are secured (Ferguson, 2005; Donner, 2009 ).
Despite these repositionings, resource peripheries are treated "not only as peripheral places but as peripheral to disciplinary thinking" in economic geography and other social sciences (Hayter et al., 2003: 16 Hayter et al. (2003: 17) suggest that theorising from the core or using the experience of the core as a conceptual template is inadequate, arguing that "studying new resource peripheries (Connell, 2007; Comaroff and Comaroff, 2011) . Various efforts to decentre the dominance of Western theory-building have drawn on dynamics in localities of the South, but also on increasing evidence of South-South cooperation. There is a growing literature on the BRICS engagements in Africa, including their increasing interest in Africa's energy resources, yet the new resource spaces arising through these engagements and their lived realities remain largely overlooked. Writing on South Africa, for example, Büscher (2009: 3956) notes that "in fact, there seems to be a glaring gap in the 'geopolitics' literature in terms of trying to link global energy power politics with local energy dynamics in Africa".
A recurring theme in writing on resource peripheries, particularly in Africa, is the enclave. Mining and extractive facilities set up in volatile or risky environments have frequently adopted the enclave model. Extractive enclaves are installed in previously staked-out extraterritorial zones that further the fragmentation of national territories, while underpinning the operation of contemporary globalized space (Sidaway, 2007) and typically have limited linkages to local firms and institutions while remaining accumulation/development and sovereignty (Sidaway, 2007) . These sub-national and transnational 'spaces of post-development' are marked by a variety of fractures and boundary practices involving articulations of citizens and subjects and places and spaces of accumulation, exclusion and inclusion (Sidaway, 2007) .
Writing on the resurgence of capital investment in African mineral resources, Ferguson (2005: 379) observed that extractive sites are often "tightly integrated with the head offices of multinational corporations and metropolitan centres, but sharply walled off from their own national societies (often literally walled, with bricks and razor wire)". For Ferguson, the 'Angola model'-in which revenues from offshore oil scarcely touch Angolan soil -offers an interpretive frame for other sites of intensive resource extraction, which are linked "in a selective, point-to-point fashion"
rather than in a continuous national grid (ibid: 380). The Angola model is also associated with a bifurcated form of governance in which the increasingly unviable formal state structures are 'hollowed out' fiscally and in terms of authority and personnel while the 'viable' enclaves are governed efficiently as private entities, in a similar vein to pre-colonial mercantilist entrepôts (Mohan, 2014 (Mohan, : 1262 , or in ways which are reminiscent of the colonial cantons, plantations and enclaves that preceded the post-war era of 'national development' (Sidaway, 2007) . This is symptomatic of 11 what Aihwa Ong (2006: 91-2) terms "postdevelopmental strategies of reconfiguring space and reregulating populations and their flows" and involves developmental apparatus and regimes being applied differently to segments of national space and/or discrete populations contained within the nation-state or 'graduated sovereignty', leading to a "galaxy of differentiated zones unevenly integrated into the structures of state power and global capital" (Ong, 1999: 232) . This form of bifurcated governance and 'selective territorialisation' has replaced state-led mining across Africa, Asia and Latin America. In the Zambian copper belt of the 1950s and 1960s, for example, "socially thick" forms of public investment accompanied the construction of company towns for thousands of mineworker households (Ferguson, 1999) . In its place is a "thin" sociality, revealing the geographies of exclusion and dispossession often found in resource-rich low-income countries (Ferguson, 2005: 380; Bridge, 2009 ). commonly in the Zambezi valley. Up to 50,000km 2 in size, they were granted to prazeiros of Portuguese decent who gave titular obedience to the Portuguese crown and whose powers were practically unlimited, building up private armies and virtually independent fiefdoms as a result. As a town, Tete grew rich or declined along with interior trade and with no significant commercial hinterland it seems the Portuguese considered abandoning the town until it gained a new lease of life in the 18 th century with the expansion of gold mining north of the Zambezi (Newitt, 1995) .
Tete has a long history of being administered through concessions, originally through the prazos and several sugar plantations that were established in the region but later, in human displacement, violence and environmental destruction (Isaacman and Isaacman, 2013) . In many ways a kind of 'post-colonial amnesia' has prevailed around Cahora Bassa where many of these failures have been forgotten or downplayed (Isaacman and Isaacman, 2013) and consequently there is a danger that they will be reproduced in some of the large-scale hydro-power and other energy mega-projects currently being considered by the Mozambican state. Instead of powering development in Mozambique, Cahora Bassa became a hub of hydropower generation for southern Africa in the 1970s, feeding industrialization in apartheid South Africa 2 . The dam became central to a colonial export-oriented economy that encouraged the sale of electricity to fuel industrialization in neighbouring countries and created an electricity system that today exhibits entrenched path dependencies due to the large investments made into the dam itself and associated grid infrastructure which has prioritised the needs of export energy markets and industrial consumers over those of the communities that live in close proximity to the dam, despite the historically low levels of electricity access in Tete. More recently, this trend has continued as Tete hosts another planned energy mega-project with the proposed Mphanda Nkuwa dam, sited 60 km downstream from Cahora Bassa at a cost of US$2.2 billion. When completed, the project will produce 1300 MW of power and is intended to attract energy-intensive industries to Mozambique and to improve its balance of payments through regional electricity sales. Vigorously opposed by a range of civil society organisations because of the anticipated socio-ecological implications, the project will force 1400 households to relocate and will indirectly affect the livelihoods of a further 200,000 Mozambicans (Morrissey, 2013; Isaacman and Sneddon, 2003) .
The coal mega-projects in Tete
It is unknown when Tete's coal was first discovered, but the artist and explorer Thomas Baines first captured onto canvass a coal outcrop on the banks of the Zambezi in the late 1850s. The first geological works in Tete referred to the studies of 14 coal occurrence, and were undertaken in 1859 by Richard Thornton, a geologist on the Zambezi expedition under Dr David Livingstone and Guyot (Hatton and Fardell, 2011) . Coal has been mined intermittently in Moatize since the 1930s, but by the turn of the 21 st century, mining in the region was confined to villagers who fired bricks using coal from the abandoned mines of Carbomoç, Mozambique's now defunct state-owned coal corporation, and to young men called garimpeiros who panned for gold in nearby streams (Gerety, 2013) . In the remainder of the paper we trace the emergence of three particular spatialities resulting from Tete's growing resource economy: the infrastructure networks being constructed around the extractive industries, the enclave spaces arising from the coal boom and the particular labour geographies and material struggles shaping them, and the distinctive urban geographies unfolding in Tete. Our research in Tete was conducted over three periods in the last three years (January and July 2012, October 
Emerging infrastructure networks
Materially, coal is a bulk commodity. Exported at high volumes, it demands extensive infrastructure to move output to market. If made publically available, mining-linked transport infrastructure can enhance mobility for residents while spurring forward and backward linkages and economic diversification (Morris, Kaplinsky and Kaplan, 2012 ). Yet regional transport networks are a weak link in Tete's coal production chain. The dominant mining firms in Tete have struggled to secure adequate infrastructure, mostly financing it through private investment. As such, they have tended to capture it for their exclusive benefit, with little investment beyond bulk channels for coal (Robbins and Perkins, 2012) . Newer entrants, such as Jindal and Beacon Hill, are currently trucking coal to the coast, raising their operational costs while imposing external costs including damage to roadways, air and water pollution 
Labour, material linkages and enclaves
As with other hydrocarbon industries, opencast coal mining is normally highly capital intensive, dominated by a handful of players, and generates few employment opportunities for directly affected communities. According to data from the Ministry of Mineral Resources, the coal industry directly employs 7,500 Mozambicans (Resenfeld, 2012) and mine construction could eventually create up to 25,000 temporary jobs (ibid). When a mine opens in a particular area in Tete, residents have high hopes for jobs but the reality usually falls short, with jobs limited to a small number of highly specialised technical positions, private security or chauffeurs. 
Disconnections: dispossession and displacement in Tete
Designed by Portuguese town planners in the 1940s and 1950s, Tete city is bisected by the Zambezi River, and at its heart is the Samora Machel suspension bridge (completed in 1973) , which serves as a crucial link between southern and northern Mozambique (see Figure 2) . Only a few years ago, Tete city was often regarded amongst expats, journalists and former colonial settlers and officials (many living in Maputo) as a 'sleepy backwater', a scripting shared by many tourist guides and trade journals, which saw it as a place largely for long-distance truckers to stop overnight on their way to and from Malawi and Zimbabwe. (Mosca and Selemane, 2011; World Bank, 2010) .
[ Figure 2 here]
The focal point of urban growth is around the Matema and Matundo neighbourhoods.
This area was largely non-existent three years ago but now hosts numerous mining buying a plot of land (Mosca and Selemane, 2011: 43 In a sense, the initial promise of the coal boom has never fully materialised for many
Mozambicans. As a restaurant owner recalled "we had heard there were thousands of justifying the further enclosure of rural communal land (Lagerkvist, 2014) . Municipal officials are ill-prepared for managing the multiple pressures and cumulative effects arising from the coal operations. At the local and provincial levels, institutional capacity for planning and administering urban development is extremely limited, resulting from years of public sector neglect since the beginnings of Mozambique's post-socialist transition (Pitcher, 2006) , coupled with Tete's rapid pace of change.
There are also difficulties in collecting local property taxes, and municipal revenues rely heavily on fees derived from municipal markets. Furthermore, inter-agency coordination has also proven challenging. The provincial Departments of Agriculture, Industry and Commerce, Mineral Resources, Energy, Transport, Health, and Public
Works have all had direct dealings with mining companies, but they have not begun to coordinate their policies and messages (Besharati, 2012) . There are, however, very few concrete policy proposals to suggest exactly how this structural transformation is to be realised, and there is currently little evidence that extractive industries are effecting any such transformation whilst the much heralded growth from the extractive turn seems anything but equitable. Having strengthened its grip on the state after years of post-war direct budget support from western donors that aimed to enhance state capacity (Manning and Malbrough, 2012) , Frelimo now stands to consolidate and entrench its power even further with the spoils of the resources boom as it appears to swap dependence on aid for a dependence on natural resources. Industrial and mineral resources mega-projects account for the vast majority of FDI inflows and these, along with several large-scale infrastructural projects, are seen as a statement of Mozambique's impending modernity, underpinning claims that development is being geographically disseminated to impoverished peoples and places in the process. Yet, such strategies fall within a profit-seeking framework that allows little room for tackling the social and ecological implications that mega-projects engender. The coal projects in Tete, and any wider consideration for planning for accelerated urban growth, are clearly designed for 'big business' with little space for ordinary citizens to participate.
Affected populations have little input in planning strategies despite bearing much of the public costs and risks from the extractive activity, ranging from degraded roads, air and water pollution, to industrial fires and population displacement (Kabemba and Nhancale, 2011; Human Rights Watch, 2013; Vunjanhe and Nhampossa, 2012) . Civil society organizations have expressed concerns about the displacement of local communities, the ecological implications of opencast mining, the limited job creation and capacity building, the lack of transparency around the licence agreements between mining companies and the state (which many regard as too advantageous to foreign companies and investors), the incentives and tax breaks being used to lure foreign capital, the absence of sufficient fiscal regulations, the limited resource sovereignty afforded to Mozambique and the state's failure to locally redistribute the wealth generated by hydrocarbon revenues.
Studying the expansion of extractive industry into new and 'unconventional' resource peripheries like Tete and the confluence of contending voices and interests found there can provide valuable insights into the intensified processes and patterns of 29 uneven development within contemporary spaces of enclosure in the global south, but also enables a 'theorizing back' on the relationship between resources and economic geography from places outside the core of global capitalism (Sheppard, 2013) . In
Tete, a variety of strategies for reconfiguring space and reregulating populations and their flows co-exist as the developmental apparatus is applied differently to segments of national space and discrete populations contained within the nation-state and as articulations between territory, accumulation/development and sovereignty are reworked, producing a "galaxy of differentiated zones unevenly integrated into the structures of state power and global capital" (Ong, 1999: 232) . Our research underlines the need to study such spaces of postdevelopment and the intersections of enclosure and enclavization with macroshifts in the geography of accumulation that accompany them.
As a (peripheral) resource economy in formation, Tete is witnessing the rapid emergence of several distinctive spatialities suggestive of a "new metageography of development" (Sidaway, 2007) given the proliferation of enclaved mineral-rich "patches" (Ferguson, 2006) , privatised regional transport corridors/networks and urban spaces of enclosure. Our focus here is on coal mining, but further research is needed in order to consider how the socio-material differences between coal, LNG and other resources might be significant in theorizing these emerging spatial configurations in Tete and beyond (Bridge, 2009 ). These enclavic spaces of postdevelopment are being built on the ruins of Frelimo's post-colonial nationalist and socialist projects, in which Tete figured prominently, and are shaped by the colonial legacies of underdevelopment and by histories of privatised and securitised administration by colonial concession. They reveal much about the changing political economy of contemporary Mozambique, and given their heavy orientation toward the needs of export markets and foreign investors, they appear to offer little hope for the future reduction of poverty and inequality, increased mobility of local people or the rebuilding of urban spaces ravaged by decades of conflict. Tete may no longer be a "sleepy backwater" but the distance between the majority of its citizens and the centres of political and economic power will likely remain for some time to come as some groups benefit from and are integrated into global circuits of production while others suffer displacement and dispossession.
